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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN BONDING CO.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MAUREEN NELSON,
Defendant-Respondent,

No. 860050

and
KEITH R. NELSON, dba AAA
ELECTRIC SERVICE, and KEITH
R. NELSON, an individual,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the lower court err in dismissing defendant Maureen
Nelson from liability under the terms of an Indemnification
Agreement on the grounds that Maureen Nelson received insufficient notice from the plaintiff relating to her liability?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action originally brought by the plaintiff
American Bonding Co. against Keith R. Nelson who was the owner
of AAA Electric Service and against his former wife Maureen
Nelson.

Plaintiff claimed that the defendants, as indemnitors
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were obligated to reimburse it for sums expended pursuant
to a surety bond issued for construction work performed by
AAA Electric Service.

Defendants denied any liability and

asserted that Plaintiff had failed to properly settle the
outstanding obligations and therefore claimed damages
against it.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
This matter was tried to the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
commencing on February 2, 1981.

On the second day of trial

Judge Rigtrup granted defendant Maureen Nelson's Motion to
Dismiss and removed her from the litigation.

The trial con-

tinued for an additional ten days as to the various claims
and counterclaims of Plaintiff and defendant Keith R. Nelson.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of
the Court were ultimately entered on December 13, 1985.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence introduced in the lower court during the
two-week trial involved an extremely complicated set of facts
common in construction-type cases.

Fortunately, for the

purposes of this appeal, the facts are extremely simple in
that the actual construction claims are not at issue.

Rather,

the only facts required to understand this appeal are the
circumstances relating to the execution of the Indemnification
Agreement and the subsequent events relating to Plaintiff's
claim of loss.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In September of 1973 defendant Keith R. Nelson was married
to Maureen Nelson.

At that time he had organized his own

electrical company and was doing business as AAA Electrical
Service.

Because he was required to obtain a surety bond in

order to perform work at the Salt Lake City International
Airport, he approached Plaintiff for the purpose of issuing
such bond.

As a condition for issuing a construction bond

Plaintiff required both Mr. Nelson and his wife to execute a
"Blanket Indemnity Agreement."

A copy of this agreement is

attached herein as Exhibit A to the Appendix.
Accordingly, on September 17, 19 7 3 the document was
executed by Mr. Nelson (as an individual and on behalf of AAA
Electric Service) and by Maureen Nelson.

At trial Mrs. Nelson

identified her signature but could not specifically recall
signing the document.

(R. 197). During this time, Mr. and

Mrs. Nelson resided at their Salt Lake City residence at 4265
South 615 East.
Subsequently, Mr. Nelson and his company undertook a
construction project at Stapleton International Airport in
Denver, Colorado.

Again, the plaintiff issued a bond to

insure the company's performance of the work and payment of
job obliations.

In the latter part of 1975 the plaintiff was

notified that certain materialmen had not been paid by Nelson
and that the government was considering a default on the
project.

(R. 88-91) .

On November 19, 1975 Plaintiff through its executive
officer sent a letter to both Keith Nelson and Maureen Nelson
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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regarding the claims that had been made to the bonding company.
The letter to Keith Nelson and the letter to Maureen Nelson
were both addressed to the same address at 4265 South 615 East
in Salt Lake City.

A copy of the Keith Nelson letter was also

sent to Maureen Nelson as well as to Dean Vanatta, the attorney
for American Bonding.

A copy of the letter to Maureen Nelson

was sent to Keith Nelson and also to Mr. Vanatta.

The plain-

tiff sent these letters both by certified mail and by regular
mail.

Subsequently, the plaintiff received back unopened both

of the certified mail letters which had been stamped unclaimed
together with the certified returns also marked unclaimed.
The letters sent by regular mail, however, were never returned
to the plaintiff.

(R. 195). Copies of the letters sent to

Keith Nelson and to Maureen Nelson are attached herein as
Exhibits B and C to the Appendix.

Unquestionably, both certified

and uncertified letters were sent to the address where Maureen
Nelson resided.
Mrs. Nelson testified that she did not hear from anybody
with respect to any bonds regarding the Denver airport.

She

did not receive any letters from any insurance agent giving
her notice of her husband's application for additional bond.
(R. 199). She testified that during the 1975 period she was
having severe domestic problems with her husband and that she
was not in favor of him going to Denver since she believed
this would only aggravate the situation.
and took the Denver job anyway.

Her husband disagreed

(R. 201). At this time Mr.

Nelson was not residing at the family residence but did come
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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frequently to the residence to visit his children and to
pick up his mail.

(R. 196).

Mrs. Nelson stated that she could not recall ever
receiving a copy of the November 19, 1975 letter.

(R. 201).

She also did not recall receiving notice in her mailbox
concerning the certified letter which was sent to her.

She

stated that 19 75 was a bad year because of their domestic
problems.

She also stated that her husband would receive

his mail at the residence but she did not know what he picked
up.

(R. 204).
Subsequently, Plaintiff entered into a Settlement Agree-

ment with numerous parties including the federal government.
There is no dispute that Mr. Nelson and his company were
intimately involved in these negotiations and was apprised of
all of the proposed settlement offers.

(R. 123-127; 129-135;

Exs. 13 and 14). During this period of time Mr. Nelson and
AAA Electric was represented by James Kruetz who was a
Denver attorney.

(R. 116).

At the time of trial both Maureen Nelson and Keith Nelson
were represented by Salt Lake attorney John J. McCoy.

The

lower court questioned Mrs. Nelson about the dual representation and she stated that she was made aware of the advantages
and disadvantages of having a single counsel for both parties
but desired to go ahead with him representing both interests.
(R. 190-191).

After two days of hearing Plaintiff rested.

At

the conclusion of Plaintiff's case defense counsel moved to
dismiss defendant Maureen Nelson on the basis that she had not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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been properly notified of the claim asserted against her as
an indemnitor.

The lower court granted Defendant's motion

and dismissed Mrs. Nelson from the remainder of the lawsuit.
A copy of the argument and decision of the lower court is
attached herein as Exhibit D.
In July of 1985, when this matter came before the lower
court to finalize the decision, additional statements were
made by the court concerning the basis for dismissal of Mrs.
Nelson.

The statement of the lower court is attached herein

as Exhibit E.

The Findings and Judgment are attached as

Exhibit F.
This appeal is directed solely to the dismissal of
defendant Maureen Nelson
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court improperly dismissed Maureen Nelson as
a defendant in this lawsuit since under the terms of the
Indemnity Agreement no notice of any claim was requir€>d to be
given to Mrs. Nelson.

However, such notice was given to her

and was sufficient to apprise her of the claims being asserted.
Mrs. Nelson proved no prejudice because of the alleged inadequacy
of the notice which was sent to her.

Thus, under the terms of

the Indemnity Agreement Mrs. Nelson was personally liable for
the losses sustained by the plaintiff.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT MAUREEN NELSON.
The lower court dismissed the claim against Maureen
Nelson on the basis that she had been given an inadequate
notice as to the claims being asserted against her by the
plaintiff and that she was not kept informed as to the
subsequent events leading to the settlement of the various
claims by Plaintiff.

(R. 291-292) . This decision is

incorrect based on the following:

first, the terms of the

Indemnification Agreement itself required no formal notice
to be given to Mrs. Nelson nor did it require that she be
made an integral part of any settlement proceedings; second,
Mrs. Nelson was sent a notice of the problem concerning her
husband's company and therefore even if notice was required
it was adequately given.

In addition, Mrs. Nelson was still

married to Keith Nelson and was presumably aware of the problems
he was having at the Stapleton Airport; third, Mrs. Nelson
failed to show what actions she would have taken haid the
notice been more specific or had she been involved in the
settlement proceedings and therefore failed to show any prejudice which would allow dismissal of her from this suit.
These contentions will now be addressed in. serium.
A.

The Terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement
Controls and No Notice was Therefore Required
Nor Was Participation in the Settlement
Negotiations Required.

It is undisputed that Mrs. Nelson executed the Blanket
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-7Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Indemnity Agreement on September 17, 1973.

At that time Mr.

Nelson was seeking a construction contract on the Salt Lake
City International Airport.

The Federal Government would not

allow him to work on this project without a performance bond.
The plaintiff, which agreed to issue such bond, conditioned
such issuance upon indemnification both from Mr. Nelson and
Maureen Nelson.

The obvious reason for requiring Mrs. Nelson

to be a signatory to the Agreement was to prevent a transfer
of assets between husband and wife thereby defeating the terms
of the Indemnity Agreement.
The terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement are clear
and unambiguous.

It is unnecessary to extensively analyze

the Blanket Indemnity Agreement since the majority of its
terms are not relevant to this appeal.

The Agreement basically

requires the indemnitors to pay for any losses sustained by
the surety as a result of the default of the principal.

The

Indemnity Agreement is perpetual in nature in that it applies
to all bonds or obligations underwritten by the surety, present
and future.

It provides that an indemnitor may terminate his

or her obligation as to future bonds at any time by sending the
proper notice to the surety.

No claim has been made that

Maureen Nelson ever exercised this provision.

(Paragraph 19 of

Agreement).
There are several provisions throughout the Agreement
relating to notice but specifically Paragraph 11 addressed
the question of notice.

It states:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Indemnitors hereby waive notice of the
execution of said Bond and of the acceptance of this
Agreement, and the Principal and the Indemnitors
hereby waive all notice of any default, or any other
act or acts giving rise to any claim under said Bond,
as well as notice of any and all liability of the
Surety under said Bond, and any and all liability on
their part hereunder, to the end and effect that, the
Principal and the Indemnitors shall be and continue
liable hereunder, notwithstanding any notice of any
kind to which they might have been or be entitled, and
notwithstanding any defenses that they might have been
entitled to make.
It is elementary that the nature of an indemnitor's
liability under an indemnity agreement is determined solely
by the provisions of the indemnity instrument.

United States

Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Napier Electric & Construction Co.,
571 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. App. 1978).

It is also elementary that

an indemnitor is liable under the terms of the agreement even
if the indemnitor does not understand the terms or has not
thoroughly read it.

Universal Surety Co. v. Jed Construction

Co., 265 N.W.2d 219 (Neb. 1978).

Further, even if a personfs

motive for initially becoming an indemnitor changes during
the course of time, that person is still liable for any subsequent bonding by the surety until that person has terminated
his or her obligations under the indemnity agreement pursuant
to its own terms.

Of course, upon withdrawal by any indemnitor,

the surety then has an opportunity to examine the risk before
issuing additional bonds. As stated by a Florida Appellate
Court:
We can find no authority for the proposition
that an individual who undertakes an obligation as
indemnitor on behalf of a principal to whom he then
has a business relationship, thus making the arrangeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment advantageous to both, should be entitled to
terminate that obligation when the business relationship has ended and the arrangement is no longer
beneficial to the indemnitor. His motive for undertaking the obligation may no longer exist, and
indeed he may have every reason in the world for
desiring to relieve himself of the obligation, but
he nevertheless remains bound by the clear language
of the agreement. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 369
S.2d 351 (Fla. App. 1979).
Indemnity agreements have even been held to extend beyond the
life of the indemnitor thereby making the estate of the indemnitor
liable for any subsequent obligation.

Travelers Indemnity Co.

v. Ducote, 380 S.2d 10 (La. 1980).
The terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement are written
for the protection of the surety.

Before performance and pay-

ment bonds are issued, the principal obligor (AAA Electric
Service in this case) and/or the indemnitors must have sufficient
collateral to protect the surety should a demand on the bond
be made.

Construction bonds are required by law on significant

federal, state, political subdivision and even private construction projects, and sureties routinely issue many bonds to
their principals merely upon request.

The indemnity agreement,

therefore, has been drawn so that it will continue to run
until such time as terminated by the indemnitors or by the
surety.

It is not unusual for an indemnitor to be unsiware of

the circumstances surrounding the business of the principal or
even the claims that are being asserted against the principal
unless he or she becomes directly involved in the business.
The indemnitor has, in effect, agreed to pay back any loss
sustained by the surety provided that the loss was paid in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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good faith.
In the instant situation the equities involved are even
more apparent.

Mrs. Nelson was married to Mr. Nelson and

enjoyed the financial benefits of his construction activities
for a number of years after execution of the Blanket Indemnity
Agreement.

She was fully aware that he was working in Colorado

and was no doubt benefitting financially from the money he
received from this bonded contract.
The authorities are legion in holding under the terms
of an indemnity agreement that unless such agreement specifically requires notice, the failure to give notice does not
defeat the claim of the indemnitee.

As stated by one legal

authority:
Where notice to the indemnitor is required by
the terms of the contract, it must be given. In
the absence of any such requirement, however, notice
is not necessary to fix liability of the indemnitor,
and in an action by the indemnitee against the
indemnitor the former need not allege or prove
notice of the act on which the obligation to indemnify
is to arise. 41 Am. Jur.2d §40, p. 730.
See also, 42 C.J.S. §15, p. 592.
As stated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals:
Unless the Indemnity Agreement so specifies,
neither Massachusetts, nor any other court that we
have been able to discover, requires an indemnitee
to notify an indemnitor to come in and defend.
Indeed, he need not even give notice of the claim.
Boston & Main Railroad v. Bethleham Steel Co.,
311 F.2d 847, 849 (1st Cir. 1963).
See also, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Strey, 512 F. Supp. 540
(D. Tenn. 19 81); Crystal River Enterprises, Inc. v. Nasi,
311 S.2d 77 (Fla. App. 1981); McStain Corp. v. Elfline
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plumbing & Heating, 558

P.2d 588 (Colo. App. 1976); and

Delaware & H. R. Corp. v. Adirondack Farms Co-Op., 306 N.Y.S.2d
1002 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
Thus, under the specific terms of the agreement as well
as under general indemnity law no notice whatsoever Wcis
required to be given to defendant Maureen Nelson of the
claims being asserted against the surety.

With this principle

in mind, it is therefore difficult to understand how the lower
court concluded that the notice was insufficient in its wording
to properly apprise Mrs. Nelson of the problems.
B.

Assuming Arguendo That Notice was Required
Then the Notice Given to Maureen Nelson was
Sufficient.

The lower court make the following Finding of Fact:
1. Timely notice of default was given to both
Keith Nelson and Maureen Nelson as prescribed by the
Agreement of Inddmnity (General) to which they were
Indemnitors.
2. Notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and
insufficient and therefore did not afford reasonable
notice to her so as to intelligently form any rational
basis for deciding whether she should exercise her
right under Paragraph 13 of the Agreement of Indemnity
(General) to defend or to prosecute any particular
claims that AAA Electric might have had against the
United States government in order to avoid or reduce
liability against her as an indemnitor.
As noted above, since no notice of the default was
required by the terms of the Agreement, any notice advising
her of the problems should have been deemed sufficient by the
Court.

However, even viewing the notice requirement in terms

of the court's own language, it is evident that Mrs. Nelson was
given sufficient notice to base any future decision as to what
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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course of action to take.

The notice which was sent to Mrs.

Nelson was not only a letter addressed to her (sent by both
regular mail and certified mail) but was also a copy of the
letter sent to Keith Nelson.

Thus, Mrs. Nelson received both

letters from the plaintiff which certainly would have advised
any person that a serious problem had arisen.
In this pargicular case the principles applied to
insurance law are applicable.

Here, if any notice was required

to be given it was by the surety to the indemnitor.

This is

not unlike an insured giving notice to their insurance company.
In construing the sufficiency of these types of notice numerous
courts have held that the notice is sufficient as long as the
insurance company is given a reasonable indication of the
claim and a chance to act.

See Goodwin v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,

656 P.2d 135 (Ida. App. 1982).

Courts have held that substantial

compliance with the notice requirement is

sufficient

and that strict literal compliance is not required.
Fire Ins. Exchange, 509 P.2d 418 (Ore. 1973).

Sutton v.

Courts have even

held that when a policy requires written notice of a loss that
oral notification is still sufficient.

Fox v. National Savings

Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1967).
Certainly, the combined letters sent to both Nelsons would
have informed any reasonable person that claims were being made
by suppliers and laborers as to the project and that there was
a substantial question of default with the Federal government.
Furthermore, the Denver project was the only job Maureen
Nelson's husband had at the time and the source of their current
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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financial troubles.

She was therefore certainly aware that

the bonded project was in serious trouble.

These letters

would have caused alarm to any indemnitor who could then
have inquired as to the specifics of the claims or other
additional information.

There is certainly no requirement

as was imputed by the lower court that each claim must be
itemized or that every contingency must be explained.

If

notice was in fact required then such notice was adequate in
the present case.
C.

Even if it is Assumed Arguendo That
Maureen Nelson Received Insufficient
Notice She Made no Showing of Any
Prejudice.

The lower court made the following findings:
Keith Nelson was kept involved and informed of
the efforts by American Bonding Co. to resolve the
problems and settlement of the construction and all
related issues pertaining to the ILS and ALS contracts
in question.

Keith Nelson was also informed of the

terms of the Take-Over Agreement and was a signatory
thereto.

Keith Nelson and his attorney, James Kruetz,

were advised of the final settlement terms with the
United States, and Keith Nelson had knowledge of the
underlying facts supporting his claim for offsets.
Mr. Nelson had reviewed such facts with his counsel,
and he had the opportunity of settling or pursuing
the claims independently if he saw fit.
The record is silent as to efforts made by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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American Bonding Co. and Farmers Home Mutual Ins.
Co. to ascertain how to keep Maureen Nelson informed
or to ascertain what information, if any, she was
receiving.

The record is also silent as to any

opportunity she was given to be a party to the Takeover Agreement.

Maureen Nelson was not a party to

the Take-Over Agreement, nor was it submitted to her
for approval or was she advised of the terms thereof
by American Bonding Co.
The lower court believed that the inadequate notice did
not allow Mrs. Nelson to participate in the settlement of
the claims and that there was some affirmative duty on the
part of Plaintiff to involve her.

Again, this conclusion is

erroneous.
First, it was the obligation of Mrs. Nelson to show that
any inadequate notice caused her prejudice.

As stated by one

authority, "Where notice of the indemnitor's liability is
required, in order to estop the indemnitee to proceed against
him, on account of delay in giving such notice, the indemnitor
must show that he was prejudiced by such delay."
§15, p. 59 3.

42 C.J.S.

Just as in normal insurance cases, the mere

failure to give notice or to give adequate notice does not
allow an insurance carrier to escape liability unless it can
show prejudice.

It is the burden upon the receiver of the

notice to show that such prejudice occurred.

Weaver Bros., Inc.

v. Chappel, 684 P.2d 123 (Ala. 1984); Hallsey v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 168 (Ore. App. 1984); and Thompson v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
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Grange Ins. Assn., 660 P.2d 307 (Wash. App. 1983).
In the instant case Maureen Nelson did not attempt to
show any prejudice nor could she have done so.

There were

no default judgments entered against AAA Electric.

At all

times AAA and Maureen's husband were represented by legal
counsel.

Mr. Nelson was involved in each aspect of the

completion of the project and was involved in all of the
negotiations with the exception of signing the Settlement
Agreement, which agreement he apparently refused to sign
unless released from indemnity.

Since Mr. Nelson was

intimately familiar with each claim being asserted, his
presence in the negotiations and settlement protected Mrs.
Nelson's interests.

Even so, however, the court gave judgment

against him, thereby indicating his responsibility in the
contract agreements.
There is nothing in the Indemnity Agreement which requires
the plaintiff to consult with each indemnitor as to any settlement claim.

Such a result would be absurd in cases such as

this in which literally hundreds of claims were being asserted
and in which the indemnitor would have absolutely no knowledge
as to the validity of any claim.

Since indemnitors can be

relatives, friends, banking institutions, etc. there is clearly
reason in not requiring their involvement in the settlement of
claims.
The court's comparison to Mr. Nelson's involvement was
inappropriate since Mr. Nelson's personal company was the
principal obligor as well as the indemnitor.

His participation
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in the settlement agreements was critical to obtaining a
fair and just payout because of his personal knowledge of
factual matters.

Since Mr. Nelson would not consent to the

final settlement agreement with the Government, AAA's claims
were reserved and therefore still could have been pursued if
it had chosen to do so.

There was no duty of the surety to

pursue AAA's claim in any event.
The identical interests of Keith and Maureen Nelson
were further illustrated by the fact that both utilized the
same attorney during the trial.

The presence or absence of

Maureen Nelson in the negotiation procedures would have had
no effect whatsoever upon the disposition of the claims or
in the ultimate outcome of this case, and she has not claimed
otherwise.
In summary, therefore, even if it is assumed that the
notice received by her in the two November letters was insufficient, Mrs. Nelson made no showing that she would have done
anything differently had more specific information been
received.

Neither did Mrs. Nelson show that she would have

done anything differently had she been involved in the settlement conferences or in the formulation of the Take-Over Agreement.
It is clear that the Indemnification Agreement never contemplated
such involvement of an indemnitor.
CONCLUSION
The Indemnification Agreement executed by Maureen Nelson
was done so freely and willingly for the purpose of assisting
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her husband to obtain the desired contract work in the
expectation of pecuniary benefit.

Two federal airport

contracts were awarded to AAA Electric that otherwise
would have been lost.
and unambiguous.

The terms of the Agreement are clear

No notice of default is legally required.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff notified both Mr. Nelson and
Mrs. Nelson in a manner reasonably calculated to cause
interested persons to investigate further if they felt the
need to do so.

In fact, Mr. Nelson was acutely aware of the

financial pressures and Maureen relied upon him to protect
her interests as he could.

The lower court's finding to

the contrary was clearly erroneous.
Even if it is assumed that the notice was inadequate/
Mrs. Nelson made no showing that she suffered prejudice
because of this notice.

The requirement of the lower court

that an indemnitor actively participate in all of the settlement
and negotiating procedures was also clearly contrary to the
intent and language of the Indemnification Agreement and is
contrary to the law.

Such a requirement would eliminate the

agreed standard of good faith payment utilized in these types
of cases since each indemnitor would always have to be a party
to all claim settlement procedures in order for a surety to
protect itself from after-the-fact criticism by indemnitors.
Mrs. Nelson was represented by the same attorney as
her husband throughout the remainder of the trial in this case.
She suffered no prejudice.

The judgment of the lower court

should be reversed, Maureen Nelson should be reinstated as
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a defendant, and as an indemnitor be subject to the present
judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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(hereinafter called the Principal) and

(Intcrc full namei and addresses of Indemnitor*, if a n y ) .

K e i t h R. N e l s o n
Maureen N e l s o n
d the Indemnitors, if any)
called the Surety},,

and AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY, 8601 Beverly Blvd., Los
WITNESSE'
al, in the transaction of business,
Atr^\jrfftUict of litigation, whether in
ytcipal or participating silentl
ive or procure certain
f :other obligations,
sions, renewals,
Principal ani
ncipal ai
to be exec!

Express unde>s$an'<HBfg that this Agreement
fter executeyDr procure to be executed

a substantial
Sonds.
to the Princii
^
utors, administrate?
assigns, as follows:

lfillmer.t of
dventurer
ure desire
nary guaranall of which
ore or hereafter
cancelling said

ibtailing of the Bonds or in the

deration of the premises and the
eceipt whereof is acknowledged, the PrincTpaJ an*
and assigns, jointly and severally, hereby covenamvai

*£S7
($1.00) in hand paid by the Surety
for themselves, their heirs, execith the Surety, its successors and

PREMIUMS
FIRST: The Principal and the Indemnitors will pay to the Surety in such manner as may be agreed upon all premiums
and charges of the Surety for the Bonds in accordance with its rate filings, its manual of rates, or as otherwise agreed upon, until
the Principal or Indemnitors shall serve evidence satisfactory to the Surety of its discharge or release from the Bonds and all liability
by reason thereof.
INDEMNITY

/

SECOND: The Principal and Indemnitors shall exonerate, indemnify, and keep indemnified the Surety from and against
my and all liability for losses and/or expenses of whatsoever kind or nature (including, but rot limited to, interest, court costs and
counsel fees) and from and against any and all such losses and/or expenses which the Surety mav sustain and incur: (1) By reason
of having executed or procured the execution of the Bonds, (2) By reason of the failure of the Principal or Indemnitors to perform
or comply with the covenants and conditions of this Agreement or (3) In enforcing anv of the covenants and conditions of this
Agreement. Payment by reason of the aforesaid causes shall be made immediately to the Surety by the Principal and Indemnitors
as soon as liability exists or is asserted against the Surety, whether or not the Surety shall have made any payment therefor. In the
event the Surety shall not have made payment therefor, the Principal and the Indemnitors shall place the Surety in current funds
in an amount or amounts demanded by the Surety in its discretion as necessary to meet such existing or asserted liability, and the
Surety shall hold such funds as collateral security, in addition to the indemnity afforded by this Agreement, with the right to
use such funds or anv part thereof, at any time, in payment or compromise of such existing or asserted liability. In the event of
any payment by the Surety, the Principal and Indemnitors further agree that in any accounting between the Surety and the Principal,
or between the Surety and the Indemnitors, or either or both of them, the Surety shall be entitled to charge for any and all disbursements made by it in good faith in and about the matters herein contemplated by this Agreement under the belief that it is or
was liable for the sum or sums so disbursed, or that it was necessary or expedient to make such disbursements, whether or not such
liability, necessity or expediency existed; and that the vouchers or other evidence of any such payments made by the Surety shall
be prima facie evidence of the fact and amount of the liability to the Surety.
ASSIGNMENT
THIRD: The Principal and Indemnitors will assign, transfer and set over, and do hereby assign, transfer and set over, to
the Surety, as collateral, to secure the obligations of any and all paragraphs of this Agreement and any other indebtedness and liabilities of the Principal to the Surety, whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the assignment in the case of each contract to become
effective as of the date of the bond covering such contract, but only in the event of (1) any assertion by the obligee(s) in said Bonds
of any breach or default in any of said Bonds, or the Principal has abandoned the work on or forfeited any contract OT contracts
covered by any of said Bonds, or has failed to pay obligations incurred in connection therewith; or (2) of any claim or demand
upon the Surety, the Principal or obligee (s) in the Bonds by reason of the non-payment of any laborer, materialman or subcontractor or the supplier of other services rendered in the performance of any said contracts; or (3) of any breach of the provisions
of any of the paragraphs of this Agreement; or (4) of a default in discharging such other indebtedness or liabilities when due;
or (5) of any assignment by the Principal for the benefit of creditors, or of the appointment, or of any application for the arvpoint' mem, of a receiver or trustee for the Principal whether insolvent or not; or (6) of any proceeding which deprives the Principal
of the u*e of any of the machinery, equipment, plant, tools or material referred to in section (b) of this paragraph; or (7) of the
Principal's dy'mf:, absconding, disappearing, incompetency, being convicted of a felony or imprisoned, ii the Principal be an individual or individuzh: (a) All rights of the Principal and Indemnitors, or of any of them, in, and growing in any manner out of,
m/M contracts referred to in the Bonds, or in, or growing in any manner out of the Bonds; (b) All the rights, title and interest of
Efee Principal and Indemnitors; or of any of them, in and to all machinery, equipment, plant, tools and material which are now, or
K a y hereafter be, shout or upon the site or sires of any and all contractual work referred to in the Bonds or elsewhere, including
T materia It purchased ior or chargeable to any and all contracts referred to in the bonds, materials which may be in process of con^ ttruction, in storage elsewhere, or in transportation to any and all of said sites; (c) All the rights, title and interest of the Principal and Indemnitors, or of any of them, in and to all subcontracts let or to be let in connection with any and all contracts
nkrrtd to in the Bonds, and in and to all surety bonds supporting such subcontracts; (d) All actions, causes of actions, claims and
demands whatsoever which the Principal and Indemnitors or any of them, may have or acquire against any subcontractor, laborer
or materialman, or any person, firm or corporation furnishing or agreeing to furnish or supply labor, material, supplies, machinery,
Form
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IUUIS vr vuizi equipment in connection with or on account of any and all contracts referred to in the Bonds; and against anv surety
or sureties of any subcontractor, laborer or materialman; (e) Any and all percentages retained and any and all sums that may be
due or hereafter become due on account of any and all contracts referred to in the Bonds and all other contracts whether bonded or
not in which the Principal has an interest; (f) All actions, causes of actions, claims and demands for damage to the work performed
by or on behalf of the Principal under any contract referred to in the Bonds and caused by any act or omission of any persons, firm.
corporation or other legal entity, whether public or private.
TRUST

FUND

F O U R T H : If any of the Bonds are executed in connection with a contract which by its terms or by law prohibits the assignment of the contract price, or any part thereof, the Principal and Indemnitors covenant and agree that all payments received for
or on account of said contract shall be held as a trust fund in which the Surety has an interest, for the payment of obligations incurred
in the performance of the contract and for labor, materials, and services furnished in the prosecution of the work provided in said
contract or any authorized extension or modication thereof; and, further, it is expressly understood and declared that all monies
due and to become due under any contract or contracts covered by the Bonds arc trust funds, whether in the possession of the Principal or Indemnitors or otherwise, for the benefit of and for payment of all such obligations in connection with any such contract
or contracts for which the Surety would be liable under any of said Bonds, and this Agreement and declafation shall also constitute notice of such trust.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
F I F T H : This Agreement shall constitute a Security Agreement to the Surety and also a Financing Statement, both in
accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code of every jurisdiction wherein such Code is in effect and may be so
used by the Surety without in any way abrogating, restricting or limiting the rights of the Surety under this Agreement or under
law, or in equity.
TAKEOVER
S I X T H : In the event of any breach or default asserted by the obligee in any said Bonds, or the Principal has abandoned
the work on or forfeited any contract or contracts covered by any said Bonds, or has failed to pay obligations incurred in connection therewith, or in the event of the death, disappearance, Principal's conviction for a felony, imprisonment, incompetency, insolvency, or bankruptcy of the Principal, or the appointment of a receiver or trustee for the Principal, or the property of the Principal, or in the event of an assignment for the benefit of creditors of the Principal, or ii any action is taken by or against the
Principal under or by virtue of the National Bankruptcy Act, or should reorganization or arrangement proceedings be filed by or
against the Principal under said Act, or U any action is taken by or against the Principal under the insolvency or bankruptcy law?
of any Country, State, Possession, or Territory, foreign or domestic, the Surety shall have the right, at its option and in its sole
discretion and is hereby authorized, with or without exercising any other right or option conferred upon it by law or in the term*
of this Agreement, to take possession of any part or all of the work under any contract or contracts covered by any said Bonds, and
at the expense of the Principal and Indemnitors to complete or arrange for the completion of the same, and the Principal and
Indemnitors shall promptly upon demand pay to the Surety all lossses, and expenses so incurred.
CHANGES
S E V E N T H : The Surety is authorized and empowered, without notice to or knowledge of the Indemnitors to assent to
any change whatsoever in the Bonds, and/or any contract referred to in the Bonds, and/or in the general conditions, plans and/or
specifications accompanying said contracts, including, but not limited to, any change in the time for the completion of said contracts
and to payments or advances thereunder before the same may be due, and to assent to or take any assignment or assignments, to
execute or consent to the execution of any continuations, extensions, or renewals of the Bonds and to execute any substitute or
substitutes therefor, with the same or different conditions, provisions and obligees and with the same or larger or smaller penalties,
it being expressly understood and agreed that the Indemnitors shall remain bound under the terms of this Agreement even though
any such assent by the Surety does or might substantially increase the liability of said Indemnitors.
ADVANCES
E I G H T H : The Surety is authorized and empowered to guarantee loans, to advance or lend to the Principal a/iy money,
which the Surety may see fit, for the purpose of any contracts referred to in, or guaranteed by the Bonds; and all money expended
in the completion of any such contracts by the Surety or lent or advanced from time to time to the Principal, or guaranteed by the
Surety for the purpose of any such contracts, and all costs, and expenses incurred by the Surety in relation thereto, unless repaid
with legal interest by the Principal to the Surety when due, shall be presumed to be a loss by the Surety for which the Principal and
the Indemnitors shall be responsible, notwithstanding that said money or any part thereof should not be so used by the Principal.
BOOKS A N D R E C O R D S
N I N T H : At any time, and until such time as the liability of the Surety under any and all said Bonds is terminated, the
Surety shall have the right to reasonable access to the books, records, and accounts of the Principal and Indemnitors; and any
bank depository, materialman, supply house, or other person, firm, or corporation when requested by the Surety is hereby authorized
to furnish the Surety any information requested including, but not limited to, the status of the work under contracts being performed by the Principal, the condition of the performance of such contracts and payments of accounts.
DECLINE EXECUTION
T E N T H : Unless otherwise specifically agreed in writing, the Surety may decline to execute any Bond and the Principal
and Indemnitors agree to make no claim to the contrary in consideration of the Surety's receiving this Agreement; and ii the Surety
shall execute a Bid or Proposal Bond, it shall have the right to decline to execute any and all of the bonds that may be required
in connection with any award that may be made under the proposal for which the Bid or Proposal Bond is given and such declination
shall not diminish or alter the liability that may arise by reason of having executed the Bid or Proposal Bond.
NOTICE OF EXECUTION
E L E V E N T H : The Indemnitors hereby waive notice of the execution of said Bonds and of the acceptance of this Agreement, and the Principal and the Indemnitors hereby waive all notice of any default, or any other act or acts giving rise to any claim
under said Bonds, as well as notice of any and all liability of the Surety under said Bonds, and any and all liability on their part hereunder, to the end and effect that, the Principal and the Indemnitors shall be and continue liable hereunder, notwithstanding any notice
of any kind to which they might have been or be entitled, and notwithstanding any defenses they might have been entitled to make.
E X E M P T I O N WAIVER
T W E L F T H : The Principal and the Indemnitors hereby waive, so far as their respective obligations under this Agreement
are concerned, all rights to claim any of their property, including their respective homesteads, as exempt from levy, execution, sale or
other legal process under the laws of any Country, State, Territory or Possession, foreign or domestic.
SETTLEMENTS
T H I R T E E N T H : The Surety shall have the right to adjust, settle or compromise any claim, demand, suit or:judgment
upon the Bonds unless the Principal and the Indemnitors shall request the Surety to litigate such claim or demand, or to defend
such suit, or to appeal from such judgment, and shall deposit with the Surety, at the time of such request, cash or collateral satisfactory to the Surety in kind and amount, to be used in paying any judgment or judgments rendered or that may be rendered,
with Tnteresf; costs, expenses and attorneys' fees, including those of the Surety.
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f U L M L L A i r l ; In the event the Surety procures the execution of the Bonds by other sureties, or executes the Bonds
with co-sureties, or reinsures any portion of said Bonds with reinsuring sureties, then all the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall inure to the benefit of such other sureties, co-sureties and reinsuring sureties, as their interests may appear.
SUITS
FIFTEENTH: Separate suits may be brought hereunder as causes of action accrue, and the bringing of suit or the recovery
of judgment upon any cause of action shall not prejudice or bar the bringing of other suits upon other causes of action, whether
theretofore or thereafter arising.
OTHER INDEMNITY
SIXTEENTH: That the Principal and the Indemnitors shall continue to remain bound under the terms of this Agreement
even though the Surety may have from time to time heretofore or hereafter, with or without notice to or knowledge of the Principal and the Indemnitors, accepted or released other agreements of indemnity or collateral in connection with the execution or
procurement of said Bonds, from the Principal or Indemnitors or others, it being expressly understood and agreed by Principal
and the Indemnitors that any and all other rights which the Surety may have or acquire against the Principal and the Indemniton
and/or others under any such other or additional agreements of indemnity or collateral shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of,
the rights afforded the Surety under this Agreement.
INVALIDITY
SEVENTEENTH: In case any of the parties mentioned in this Agreement fail to execute the same, or in case the execution hereof by any of the parties be defective or invalid for any reason, such failure, defect or invalidity shall not in any manner
affect the validity of this Agreement or the liability hereunder of any of the parties executing the same, but each and every party so
executing shall be and remain fully bound and liable hereunder to the same extent as if such failure, defect or invalidity had not
existed. It is understood and agreed by the Principal and Indemnitors that the rights, powers, and remedies given the Surety under
this Agreement shall be and are in addition to and not in lieu of, any and all other rights, powers, and remedies which the Surety
may have or acquire against the Principal and Indemnitors or others whether by the terms of any other agreement or by operation
of law or otherwise.
ATTORNEY IN FACT
EIGHTEENTH: The Principal and the Indemnitors hereby irrevocably nominate, constitute, appoint and designate the
Surety, or any nominee(s) of the Surety, as their attorney-in-fact with the right, but not the obligation, to exercise all the rights of
the Principal and Indemnitors, or of any of them, assigned, transferred and set over to the Surety in this Agreement, and in the
name of the Principal and the Indemnitors, or in the name(s) of any of them, to make, execute and deliver any and all additional
or other assignments, documents or papers, and likewise to endorse, negotiate, transfer, collect or deposit any negotiable instrument
or the proceeds thereof received by the Surety, or its nominee(s) under any such rights assigned to it, each and all when deemed
necessary by the Surety, or its nominee(s) to give full effect not only to the intent and meaning of the within assignments, but also
to the full protection intended to be herein given to the Surety under all of the provisions of this Agreement. The Principal and
the Indemnitors hereby ratify and confirm all acts and actions taken and done by the Surety, or by its nominee(s), as such
attorney-in-fact.
TERMINATION
NINETEENTH: This Agreement may be terminated as to the Principal or as to any Indemnitor upon twenty days'
written notice sent by the Principal or by any such Indemnitor by registered mail to the Surety at its home office at Los Angeles,
California 90048. but any such notice of termination shall not operate to modify, bar or discharge the Principal or any such
Indemnitor as to the Bonds that may have been theretofore executed. Provided also, that any such termination shall not act to
terminate this Agreement as to any party who has not given the aforesaid notice to the Surety, and any such party shall continue
to remain bound under this Agreement and hereby o pressly waives any notice of termination by any other party hereunder.
TWENTIETH: This Agreement may not be changed or modified orally. No change or modification shall be effective
jnless made by written endorsement executed to form a part hereof.
TWENTY-FIRST:.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed and sealed the day and year first above written.
1TTEST OR WITNESS:
K e i t h R. N e l s o n , dba
AAA-, ELECTRICAL SERVICE

~

cf(^ /f^l)

JTST\
t e i t h R#

C O <^7

Nelson

'h^^^KXTSk^
hZfr

(SEAL)

(SEAL)
(SEAL)
(SEAL)

_. . .
7 \„
% . f
, >Keith R. Nelson, Individually

C

(SEAL)

(SEAL)
.(SEAL)
.(SEAL)
.(SEAL)

AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY

By .-« & „*«</ 1/ > 4 £

(SEAL)
Attorney-in-Fact

iportant: Forms of Acknowledgment will be found on the reverse side.
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For A c k n o w l e d g m e n t of Principal's Signature
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

UTAH
SALT

INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
%
J*s.:

LAKE

On this — l l l h
day of
September
K e i t h & Maureen
Nelson

, in the year 1 9 7 3

, before me personally come (s)

to me known and known to me to he the person(s) who (is) (a^e)
foregoing instrument
(are) described in and whojixecuted^.e
who execute
and acknowledge (s) to me that
the}! executed the sar/e.

{p??/?! (

,Jt*ri fa r<4-,-. -.

(Signature and tWe-tSHifficiil taking acknowledgment)
PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT J e 3 n M < L a m b o u " e
* " * - "
STATE OF

^

C O U N T Y OF

j*ss.:

On this

.. day of

—

, in the year 19

, before me personally comes

a member of the co-partnership of
to me known and known to me to be the person who is described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and
acknowledges to me that he executed the same as and for the act and deed of the said co-partnership.
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment)
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF

_

C O U N T Y OF

.

On this

day of

;}-

, in the year 19

, before me personally comes

to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that he resides in the City of
that he is the
of the
;
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of the said corporation;
that the seal affixed to the said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by the order of the Board of Directors
of said corporation, and that he signed his name thereto by like order.
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment)

For A c k n o w l e d g m e n t of Indemnitors 9 Signatures
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this

U T A H

SALT
17th

LAKE
day of

Keith & Maureen

September

:}••
%

j n t n c year 19

7 4

, before me personally come(s)

Nelson

to me known and known to me to be the person ( s ) vfiurjbfcjart^
and acknowledge (s) tome that
LheY
executed the same.
'

^flsjggfl^&£?** who executed the foregoing instrument
A
\
^__3f'
/
06~J?9-t
<f-m6*t«Uc£.
/(Signature and title ©fjofficial taking acknowledgment
/.J e a n M. L a m b o u r n e 4 - 4 - 7 5
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT

STATE OF
C O U N T Y OF .

On this

day of

:}

., in the year 19

, before me personally come(s)

to me known and known to me to be the person (s) who (is) (are) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and acknowledge (s) to me that
he
executed the same.
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment)
PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF
C O U N T Y OF .

On this

day of

:}-

, in the year 19

, before me personally comes

a member of the co-partnership of
— — —
—
• ;
to me known and known to me to be the person who is described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and
acknowledges to me that he executed the same as and for the act and deed of the said co-partnership.
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment)
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT

;}„,

STATE OF .
C O U N T Y OF .

On this

day of

_ ,

in the year 19

, before me personally comes

to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that he resides in the City of
that he is the .
of the
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of the said corporation;
that the seal affixed t» the said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by the order of the Board of Directors
of said corporation, and that he signed his name thereto by like order.
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment)
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REQUESTED - Cert. No. 7t>s:><u
(Copy also sent by Regular Kail)

American Bonding Company
*Ztntclnt

ijVei'vaiKa

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES - 1 6 0 1 BEVERLY BOULEVARD

LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA ? 0 M !
TELEPHONE (213) 655 8007

November 19, 1975
Mr. Keith R. Nelson
AAA Electripdl Service
4362 Soujtfi515 East
Salt I^tTe City, Utah 84107
Re:

Contract Bond Nos. 20136 & 20137
Obligee: Federal Aviation
Administration

Dear Mr. Nelson:
Your files will reflect that American Bonding Company is your surety on the above
two bonds covering projects at Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado.
Claims from unpaid materialmen and subcontractors have been filed against American
Bonding Company and the above bonds. In addition, American Bonding Company has
been sued by unpaid claimants.
As an inducement for American Bonding Company to execute bonds on your behalf,
you signed a Blanket Indemnity Agreement (copy attached) wherein you agreed,
among other things, to hold American Bonding Company harmless from any loss, costi
etc. that it might sustain due to its executing bonds on your behalf. Our counsel
in Denver, Dean R. Vanatta, Esq., is representing American Bonding Company in thei
claim matters and we request your full cooperation with him and with American
Bonding Company in endeavoring to resolve the problems of completion and unpaid
claimants. Mr. Vanattafs address and telephone number is noted below.
We are sending this letter to you for the purpose of placing you on notice of
these existing problems and to further advise you that American Bonding Company
expects you to abide by your obligations under the Blanket Indemnity Agreement.
Very truly yours,
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY

W. B. Gillingham
Vice President

WBG:pm
cc:

Mr8. Maureen Nelson
f^Sfean R. Vanatta, Esq.
Wagner, Wyers and Vanatta
921-927 Equitable Building
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u,.vxirxui; - *V.&.AUR1S RECEIPT
REQUESTED - Cert. No. 768542
(Copy also sent by Regular Hail)

American Bonding Company
^Lincoln,

^Aelnzma

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES - 8601 BEVERLY BOULEVARD
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90048
TELEPHONE (213) 6558007

November 19, 1975

Mrs.
Maureen/Nelson
4362 Soutj/615 East
S a l t L ^ k ^ C i t y , Utah

84107
Re:

AAA Electrical Service
Contract Bond Nos. 20136 & 20137
Obligee: Federal Aviation
Administration

Dear Mrs. Nelson:
American Bonding Company is the surety for AAA Electrical Service in
connection with the above two bonds. As an inducement for American Bonding
Company to execute bonds on behalf of AAA Electrical Service, you signed a
Blanket Indemnity Agreement dated September 17, 1973, wherein, among other
things, you agreed to hold American Bonding Company harmless from any loss,
costs, etc. that it might sustain due to its executing bonds on behalf of
AAA Electrical Service.
The purposecf this letter is to put you on notice that claims and suits
have been filed against American Bonding Company and its bonds noted above.
Further, American Bonding Company expects you to abide by the terms and
conditions of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement.
Very truly yours,
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY

W. B. Gillingham
Vice President
WBG:pm
cc:

Mr. Keith R. Nelson
l^ffean R. Vanatta, Esq.
Exhibit C
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MR. NORTON:

Can Counsel give me the divorce

number?
MR. McCOY:

I don't have it right here. I

handle the divorce, thank God, but I believe we can find it.
I have a motion to dismiss to make.

I don't know that now

would be an appropriate time to make it, or if we should
defer it until later,
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. McCOY:

With respect to Maureen Nelson,

I would move to dismiss on the basis that there is no proof
that notice of any of the proceedings the bonding company
.y

took in this particular case —
Mrs. Nelson.

no notice was given to

We have a situation

here where she signs

a document at her home in 1973 and then some six or seven
years down line gets a letter from the bonding company demanding
some $87,000, a rather insidious thing, to say the least.
She did sign an agreement, but there are provisions which
I donft think should be enforced.
In terms of notice, it's quite apparent to
me, from the testimony of the witnesses, that by the time
this bond loss occurred that the bonding company was looking
solely to Mr. Nelson, and they did not —

they took no steps

whatsoever to talk to Mrs. Nelson.
And under those circumstances what did they
do?

They went ahead and, number one, executed a takeover

document, which was in effect an assignment of the agreement,
of the extras, all of the contract rights, all of the
!
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receivables cf Triple A Electric Company to the bending
companies.

And that of course was done —

the record is

totally devoid of any notice whatever, written notice or
versa! notice for that matter, given to the defendant,
Maureen Nelson.
At that point it's quite apparent that nobody
had control except for the bonding company, because they
held the pursestrings and had basically all of the rights
in that particular situation•

The original indemnification

agreement contemplates that, before that takes place, that
an assignment be made of the contract rights in all the
contracts to the surety.

There is no provision in there

that says that notice shall be given% to the indemnitors.
But there is also, the way I read that document, no provision
that says that notice should not be given to the indemnitors
in the event of such an assignment.
Then going further, what occurred?

I think

that, in effect, was a disposition of collateral under both
the Colorado Commercial Code and the Utah Commercial Code.
I have checked them and their provisions are both the same
with respect to disposition of collateral on secured interestfe
in collateral.

And I think the case law is the same

basically in Colorado and in Utah.

And that is that written

notice of the disposition of the collateral must be given
to the debtor, and it's quite obvious here at the bonding
company, considering that Mrs. Nelson is a debtor, and since
they do that, then they are required under the code to give
her notice.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
The contract itself, the original indemnification
agreement provides that it shall act cr he a security
instrument under the laws of any state where the principal
«r[^oc business.

I

And in this ""articularcase itfs rirht ci

the face of the indemnity agreement, Exhibit P-l, that was
filed in the state of Colorado with the Secretary of State's
Office, thus making it a security interest.
It's quite apparent from the conduct of the
parties that this was in fact a security interest, and the
subsequent assignment was a disposition of that security
interest in the contract rights and a severing of Triple A
Electric from the United States Government.
Then going further than that, down the line
you have, at the end of the road, the settlement which was
in fact made in that particular case.

And here again, no

notice given to Maureen Nelson, no attempt to notify her.
And there certainly is an abundance of attempts to advise
Mr. Nelson of the situation, but nothing said to Mrs. Nelson.
I think it's quite apparent that at that time the bonding
company was looking solely to Mr. Nelson.

They were not

looking to Mrs. Nelson.
And under the case law that's in existence
in this state with respect —

I'll get the cases, your Honor.

I didn't know whether we would end today, or I would have
anticipated giving them to you.

But I can get them for

you.
The particular case here in Utah involved the
sale of a mobile home and the proceedings after the sale
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of that mobile home by the secured party to enforce a
deficiency.

And the Utah court in that case held thai: because

the secured parry had not. given written notice as required
V v
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Likewise, there are some Colorado cases that
say the same thing.

But here what we are trying to do is

that they are saying, "Well, we took this collateral, the
claims against the government that were extras, the balance
of the contract,and we then essentially compromised that
claim.

You might say we sold it, or whatever we did with

it, but we essentially realized what money we could out
of it, and now we want you, Mrs. Nelson, to pay the remainder}
And they cannot do that without giving written
notice to the debtor.

And I think under their own agreement,

the assignment, certainly after this long a time, some I

J

think three years or four years, even under their own

I

agreement they would have been required to give her notice.
I would grant that the contract, the indemnity
agreement sued upon here doesn't make it incumbent upon

J

the company to give her written notice, but there have been
a number of cases in this state involving essentially
forfeitures and this sort of thing that primarily involve
uniform real estate contracts where they are talking about
a forfeiture and that the interest will be forfeited and
it doesn'tsay anything about one notice or two notices,

J

but yet our Supreme Court has required that notice be given
of impending deficiencies, or shall we say defaults in

I

contracts rather than to allow a party to sit back and be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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silent: and then come in to a party and hand them a bill
for some $87,000 plus attorneys fees and expect it to be
paid after six or seven years.

Sc to me the action by the

bonding company against Mrs. Nelson should be dismissed.
THE COURT: Mr. Norton?
MR. NORTON:
no notice of claim,

Taken in order as argued, first,

at least three times there the indemnity

agreement itself does have a proceeding as to notice.
is paragraph 11 and it states:

It

"Indemnitors hereby waive

all notice of any default or any other act or acts giving
rise to any claim under said bond, as well as notice of
any and all liability of the surety under said bond and
any and all liability on their part hereunder to the end
and the effect that the principal and indemnitors shall
be and continue liable hereunder notwithstanding any notice
of any kind to which they might have or be entitled and
notwithstanding any defenses they might have been entitled
to make."
So if a provision can cover it, it has covered
it.

As to notice, secondly, the evidence is that notice

was given first by certified mail to her residence and return
unclaimed, giving her ample opportunity to get the notice
by certified mail.
Secondly, two other identical letters sent
by regular mail, one informing her of her liability and
the second one a copy of the letter to Mr. Nelson, informing
him of his liability.

Both of these letters were sent by

regular mail, addressed to Maureen Nelson.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

203

And her testimony that she was under great
emotional stress during that period of time and she simply
doesn't know what she got, that she may have received them

the 1976 deposition, taken in the divorce case, that there
was some mention of the bond.
The second contention is that if there's no
notice, then there's no claim for a deficiency.

It's hard

to keep current with the law and there is a case handed
down in Utah filed December 29, 198 0, the Utah Bank & Trust
v. Quinn case.

It's not yet in the Reporters, I believe.

And the number is 1628(a).

That case talks about the issue

that Counsel has raised as to whether or not a deficiency
can be received under the UCC if no

notice was given.

This case recognizes the apparent split between states,
some allowing the deficiency, some not, and decided that
in Utah a deficiency is awardable, and the test is that
the acts were commercially reasonable in disposing of the
collateral.
We think that in the first instance it's not
applicable, because our only obligation is to dispose of
it.

If the UCC does apply, then the test is to be

commercially reasonable.
I believe there was a third contention, and
that is that the effect of taking the assignment somehow
released Mrs. Nelson of her obligations under the indemnity
agreement.
part:

Paragraph 16 of that agreement provides in

"It being expressly understood and agreed by
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principal and indemnitors that any and all other rights
which the surety may have cr acquire against the principal
and the indemnitors cr ethers under any such other or
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in addition to and not in lieu of the rights afforded to
surety under this agreement."
In other words, the basic document between
the surety and the principal and the indemnitors is not
one of insurance, but it is one of surety, meaning that
the principal obligors and the indemnitors must first answer,
and the surety, if it be called upon to answer, is entitled
to reimbursement as per the agreement between the parties.
MR. McCOY:
make this point.

Your Honor, I would just,like to

Well, two points.

I didn't say that the assignment essentially
forfeited any rights that the bonding company had under
the indemnity agreement:.

I said that there was essentially

a disposition of the rights that those parties had in the
contract right, the principal had against the government.
And if that wasn't a disposition, certainly the settlement
that was subsequently followed was.

Neither of which showed

notice of — I'm certainly interested in the Utah Bank v.
Quinn case and what kind of collateral they were dealing
with.

I doubt they were dealing with some $200,000 in contract

rights that has really no known value, or no determinable
value in terms of what is commercially reasonable. I'll
get that case.
But going further, the only notice that has
205
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even been offered before the Court is to me a rather
innocuous letter indicating that a default has occurred
on the contract —

I think that's Exhibit P-7, your Honor --

and that they are looking to her for some action under their
indemnity agreement which she signed many years ago.
Basically all that is is about the equivalent
of, let's say I'm making payments on an automobile and the
company sends me a notice and tells me that I'm behind in
my payments. Now, that is not notice of disposition as
required by the code.

The code requires that notice of

actual disposition be given, and that letter didn't mention
anything about the deposition of the claims of Triple A
against the bonding company.

I think, additionally, that

the bonding company, by executing the final agreement, which
according to my analysis, settled the claims there against
the government at something less than 15 cents on the dollar
rather than pursue the appeals, certainly substantially
prejudices any right that Mrs. Nelson has to proceed in
any way to cover herself.
She is given absolutely no opportunity to
protect herself in this situation.

The bonding company

went ahead and did it without an even attempt at contacting
her.

And under those circumstances it seems to me

unconscionable, to say the least, that they should now be
able to come back to Mrs. Nelson and say, "You pay."

To

me this was a total waiver of any responsibility that they
had in her, of all their actions that they took after this,
and I certainly don't think thereVs any doubt but that a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 I contract, even one such as the plaintiff sues on here, car.
2 a be itiOdified by the

actions of the parties thereto.

Ar.d

it's quite apparent here that the bonding company never

3

I
4
They were looking to Keith Nelson, and I think Mrs. Nelson
5
ought to be dismissed out.
6
7

THE COURT:
I

In connection with your motion,

the Court finds that on September 17, 1973 the defendant,

8 I Maureen Nelson, was the wife of the defendant, Keith R. Nelson
9 |
10

that she knew of a job that Mr. Nelson was about to engage
in at Stapleton airport in his contracting business; that
in connection with that job and his application for bonding

11
on that job, an indemnity agreement" was submitted by
12
Mr. Nelson to Mrs. Nelson, which she signed.
13

The Court would find that she had no particular

14

knowledge or understanding as to its contents or implications

** I

The Court would further find that there is no evidence in

16 I

the record to indicate that she was involved actively or

27 J

directly in the business of the defendant, Keith Nelson,

18

and finds that she was a typical housewife.
The court finds that she signed the indemnity

19
agreement, which did not have limitations as to duration.
20
The Court observes that paragraph No. 11 of
21
the indemnity agreement, Exhibit 1-P, does in fact waive
22
23 I

notice of default.
However, the Court further observes and finds

24 I

that paragraph 13 of the indemnity agreement in Exhibit 1-P

25 |

has contained in it a right which is set forth where the
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indemnitor can use the surety to litigate any claim or demand
involved and request that a defense be asserted,.

Implicit

in that particular prevision is some requirement cf notice,
otherwise the provisions of the indemnity agreement would
have no meaning.
The Court would find that in connection with
the contracts at Stapleton International Airport, that
Mrs. Nelson knew of the jobs but had no particular intimate
knowledge of details or particular claims then involved
in these matters.
There is some substantial doubt as to whether
she did receive notice.

However, she did have mailed to

her a letter of November 19, 19 75 by American Bonding Company
a written notice of general claims which is set forth in
the Exhibit 7-P.

The Court would conclude that that notice

on its face is insufficient to satisfy the intent of the
indemnity agreement.
It simply recites generally that claims have
been asserted against the bending company in connection
with these jobs.

The letter itself does not state who the

claimants are, does not indicate the amounts of the claims,
the nature of the claims, doesn't indicate the peril in
which the indemnitors find themselves, and the Court would
conclude that one cannot be intelligently put on notice
from that letter as to what it is they are defending on,
so would conclude that that does not satisfy the reasonable
intent of the agreement.

Accordingly, I would grant the

motion to dismiss Mrs. Nelson.
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.1

Given that background, I've gone through the
record in reasonable detail, and I dcn't mean these
recitations as being sufficient to contain all the necessary

3
4

and will look to the attorneys to add the necessary detail
5
to what I generally outline as the Court's decision.
6
7

As is pointed out in Mr. Norton's summary /
I

during the second day of trial, Maureen Nelson moved for

8 I

dismissal.

9 J

found then and continues to find that timely notice of defaul^

10

The motion was granted by the Court.

The Court

was given both Keith andMaureen Nelson as prescribed by
the master indemnity agreement, or agreements to which they

11
were a party.

The Court concluded that the notice itself

12
was vague and insufficient to afford reasonable notice to
13

Maureen Nelson to intelligently form any rational basis for

14

deciding whether she should exercise her right under paragraph

15 |

13 of the blanket indemnity agreement to defend or to

16 I

prosecute any particular claims that Triple A Electric might

17

have had against the United States Government, which would

18

either avoid or reduce liability as against her as an
indemnitor.

19 |
The Court would find that even though
20
Maureen Nelson was an indemnitor in all respects to contact,
21

as was her husband, she was treated very differently than

22

her husband, Keith Nelson, as an indemnitor.

23 |

was kept involved and informed of the efforts to resolve

24 J

the problems and settlement of the construction and all

oc u

related issues pertaining to the ILS and ALS contracts in

Keith Nelson

212
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question.

He was informed on the terms of the takeover

agreement and was signatory thereto*

He and his

attorney,

James Kreutz, were advised of the final settlement terms

underlying facts supporting his claim for offsets.

He had

reviewed them with counsel and he had the opportunity of
settling or pursuing the claims independently if he saw
fit.
On the other hand, the record is silent as
to any efforts made by American Bonding and Farmers Home
Mutual to ascertain how to keep Maureen Nelson informed
or to ascertain what information, if any, she was receiving.
There was no. evidence that she was given' any opportunity
to be a party to the takeover agreement, and was not a party
to the takeover agreement specifically.

There is no evidence

that the settlement agreement entered between the FAA and
the sureties was presented to her for approval, and there
is no evidence that she was advised of the terms thereof,
as was Keith Nelson.
Accordingly, the Court concludes,as a matter
of law, that under such circumstances she cannot be bound
as an indemnitor.

Much of the difficulty experienced in

terms of reviewing the issues between the sureties and
Triple A Electric Service and Keith Nelson came about
primarily because of the way the case was presented.
The case presented by Triple A Electric and
Keith Nelson on their counterclaim for some $142,000 for
extras was presented through the oral testimony of
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A. DENNIS NORTON, ESQ. (A2425)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN § MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff American
Bonding Company
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEITH R. NELSON and AAA
ELECTRIC SERVICE, KEITH R.
NELSON, an individual and
MAUREEN NELSON, an individual,

JUDGMENT

Defendants.

KEITH R. NELSON, dba AAA
ELECTRIC SERVICE,

Civil No. C79-5195

Plaintiff,
vs.
FARMERS HOME MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Third
Party Plaintiff,
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The Court, having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law in the above-entitled matter, now enters its judgment as
follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The claims by American Bonding Company and Farmers Home

Mutual Insurance Company against Maureen Nelson be, and the same
hereby are, dismissed with prejudice,
2.

American Bonding Company and Farmers Home Mutual Insurance

Company be, and the same hereby are, awarded judgment against
Keith R. Nelson dba AAA Electric Service and Keith R. Nelson,
an individual, in sum of $38,257.37 plus interest at six percent (6%)
per annum from and after October 17, 1978 to date of Judgment, and
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
thereafter, plus costs of suit.
DATED this

13th

day of December, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Kenneth Rigtrup
Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Judge
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A. DENNIS NORTON, ESQ. (A2425)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff American
Bonding Company
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY, a
corporation/
Plaintiff,
-vKEITH R. NELSON dba AAA
ELECTRIC SERVICE, KEITH R.
NELSON, an individual and
MAUREEN NELSON, an individual,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.

KEITH R. NELSON, dba AAA
ELECTRIC SERVICE,

Civil No. C79-5195

Plaintiff,
-V-

FARMERS HOME MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third
Party Plaintiff,
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-vMAUREEN NELSON,
Third Party
Defendant.

Upon Motion of the Court, the above-entitled cause came
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah,
at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 8th
day of July, 1985, at 8:30 a.m.

Present at the hearing was John

L. McCoy in behalf of AAA Electric Service, Keith R. Nelson and
Maureen Nelson, and A. Dennis Norton in behalf of American Bonding
Company and Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Company.

The Court,

having previously tried the matter, announced from the bench its
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Timely notice of default was given to both Keith Nelson

and Maureen Nelson as prescribed by the Agreement of Indemnity
(General) to which they were indemnitors.
2.

Notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and insufficient

and therefore did not afford reasonable notice to her so as to
-2-
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intelligently form any rational basis for deciding whether she
should exercise her right under paragraph 13 of the Agreement
of Indemnity (General) to defend or to prosecute any particular
claims that AAA Electric might have had against the United States
Government in order to avoid or reduce liability against her as
an indemnitor.
3.

Keith Nelson was kept involved and informed of the efforts

by American Bonding Company to resolve the problems and settlement
of the construction and all related issues pertaining to the ILS
and ALS contracts in question.

Keith Nelson was also informed

of the terms of the take-over agreement and was a signatory thereto.
Keith Nelson and his attorney, James Cruz, were advised of the final
settlement terms with the United States, and Keith Nelson had
knowledge of the underlying facts supporting his claim for offsets.
Mr. Nelson had reviewed such facts with his counsel, and he had
the opportunity of settling or pursuing the claims independently
if he saw fit.
4.

The record is silent as to efforts made by American

Bonding Company and Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Company to
ascertain how to keep Maureen Nelson informed or to ascertain
what information, if any, she was receiving.

The record is also

silent as to any opportunity she was given to be a party to the
take-over agreement, and Maureen Nelson was not a party to the
take-over agreements, nor was it submitted to her for approval
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or was she advised of the terms thereof by American Bonding
Company.
5.

The sureties had no obligation to finance the cost of

pursuing AAA Electric Claims against others.
6.

Keith Nelson, d/b/a AAA Electric Company, could have

pursued his claims against the United States and others through
his own retained attorney, Jim Cruz, or through another attorney,
and could have attempted arrangements to post adequate security
and request the sureties to pursue such claims, Keith Nelson,
d/b/a AAA Electric, chose not to do either, and therefore cannot
be heard to complain about the sureties' settlement with the
United States,
7.

The sureties acted in good faith in paying claims and

in marketing disbursements on such claims, and as to those claims
supported by vouchers, they should be reimbursed, such vouchers
constituting prima facie evidence of liability by the indemnitors
to the sureties.
8.

The sureties paid claims and legal expenses pursuant to

its bond obligations in this case in sum of $180,759.33, less
recoveries from the United States of $93,091.96, resulting in a
net loss of $87,667.37 to sureties.
9.

The U. S. Government claimed offsetting damages and re-

procurement costs against Keith Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric Company

-4-
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of Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00).
No underlying vouchers, work sheets, ledgers or any kind of
documentation was offered by any party in this case in support
of such offsetting claim.

Mr. Vanatta was the attorney repre-

senting the sureties in settlement negotiations with the United
States.

He testified during trial in this case that he did not

now remember the specific nature of the Government claims, although he had detailed work sheets in Denver regarding the U.S.
Government offsets. Mr. Vanatta testified that during negotiations with the U.S. Government, he expended considerable time
and efforts in reviewing the offsets, but no documentation was
produced in this case concerning such claimed offsets by the U.S.
Government.

No documents were produced by any party relating to

the U.S. Government offset.

For lack of documentary evidence,

the Court finds that it cannot judge the good faith efforts or
fundamental soundness of the decision by these sureties to accept
the U.S. Government claim damage and reprocurement cost figure of
Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00) , notwithstanding Mr. Vanatta1s testimony that at the time of settlement, and at the time of trial, his considered opinion was that
the settlement was reasonable under the circumstances.
10.

The sureties are entitled to judgment against Keith

Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric Company for the disbursement amounts
of Eighty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars Thirty
Seven Cents ($87,667.37), less U.S. Government reprocurement
-5-
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costs not detailed in this case of Sixty One Thousand Four
Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00), or a net Judgment in favor
of sureties of Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven
Dollars Thirty Seven Cents ($26,257.37) plus Six percent (6%)
per annum interest from and after October 17, 19 78 to date of
Judgment.
11.

The attorneys' fees of $19,466.29 paid to Mr. Vanatta's

law firm in the handling of the bond claim are recoverable under
the Agreement of Indemnity (General), are reasonable for the
services rendered, and sureties should recover for such fees.
Said attorneys fees are included in the sureties' net loss amount
of $87,667.37.
12.

The fees charged by the firm of Snow, Christensen &

Martineau for costs and legal services incurred through the efforts
of A. Dennis Norton incident to prosecution of this case are
similarly recoverable and reasonable, especially in light of the
complexity and length of the case, and the Court finds Twelve
Thousand Dollars ($12,000,000) to be a reasonable fee to be
awarded in favor of the sureties and against the Defendant Keith
Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric Company thru trial of this matter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court having now made its Findings of Fact, now concludes
as a matter of law as follows:
1.

The Defendant Maureen Nelson should not be bound as an

Indemnitor.
2.

The Takeover Agreement between AAA Electric, American
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Bonding Company and the U.S. Government by its terms assigned the
extra work claim by AAA Electric to the sureties only to the
extent necessary to indemnify the sureties, and Keith Nelson
d/b/a AAA Electric had the power to prosecute on its own claims
against the U.S. Government in excess of that amount, or to have
the sureties prosecute such claims by depositing sufficient
collateral with the sureties.
3.

The sureties had no obligation to finance the cost of

pursuing the AAA Electric claims against any other contracting
party.

Keith Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric had a right under the

Settlement Agreement of October 17, 1978, since he was not a
signatory thereto, to undertake further actions on his claimed
extras or to contest the U.S. Government offets, although the
sureties had a right to indemnify and hold harmless the U.S.
Government upon event of such assertive claims.
4.

The sureties are entitled to Judgment against the

Defendant Keith Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric for the sum of Eighty
Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars Thirty Seven Cents
($87,667.37), less U.S. Government reprocurement costs of Sixty
One Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00), leaving a net
amount owing of Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars
Thirty Seven Cents ($26,257.37), plus Twelve Thousand Dollars
($12,000.00) attorneys1 fees by reason of prosecution of this case
by the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, or a total of
Thirty Eight Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars Thirty Seven
Cents ($38,257.37) owing plus interest at the rate of Six percent
(6%) per annum from and after October 17, 1978.
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BY THE COURT:
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Kenneth Rigtrup, Third d i s t r i c t Judge
Approved as t o form:

John McCoy
Attorneys for Keith R. Nelson and
Maureen Nelson

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
A. Dennis Norton
Attorneys for American Bonding Co. &
Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Co.
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